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`POST /api/v1/keyless/certify` gives a fresh key a certificate (Oxygen spec §14.7) for ten minutes, signed with the hub's key. The bearer is the credential: a running job's token (subject `repo:OWNER/NAME:bookmark:B`, claims `repository`, `bookmark`, `run`, `job`, `runner`, and `environment` with `approved_by` once an approved job may deploy), or one of this hub's OIDC tokens for the audience `{base_url}/keyless` (its `sub` the subject, and the same claims it carries). The body is `{"identity": base64 identity object, "proof": base64 CBOR Signature, "scope": "changes,refs"}`, the proof the fresh key's challenge signature (§14.3) over `certify_challenge(credential)` (`"oxy1 certify "` and the BLAKE3 of the credential), so it cannot be replayed with another credential. The answer is `{"certificate": base64 [certificate, signature], "subject", "expires_ms"}`; a certificate never outlives its credential, and it starts 30 s back for clocks a little behind. Each one is audited (`keyless.certified`). A runner may sign a job's receipt with such a key, certified just before it signs (scope `seal`): the receipt carries the certificate (Oxygen spec §14.6), and the hub keeps it when the certificate is this hub's, its subject is the run's repository and bookmark, its `run` and `job` claims are the run's and the job's, and it covers the moment the hub accepts it; no runner key is bound then, and the run names the signer as the runner's name with "(short-lived key)". Which issuers and subjects a repository trusts for changes and references is its policy's (docs/keyless.md, step 4). When a key it certified moves a bookmark, the hub signs an `accepted` attestation of the update with its own clock and serves it with the bookmark (Oxygen spec §14.7, step 4c), so fetches check the certificate at the hub's time. The scope given is what was asked within what the credential allows; asking for none of it is refused. |
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**Agent grants** (step 5, built 2026-10-17). An agent holds no key: its owner signs an Oxygen grant (§14.7) letting `agent:NAME@ACCOUNT` act for them, with the key their oxy home names (`oh agent grant NAME [--scope changes,seal,refs] [--for 30d]`), and `POST /api/v1/agents/grants {"grant": base64 signed grant}` keeps it and answers with the agent's token (`oxyagent_…`, shown once, kept as its BLAKE3 hash). The hub accepts a grant only for the caller's own `agent:NAME@USERNAME`, naming this hub's key as issuer, signed by a key linked to the caller's account and not yet ended; any personal token of the account may send it, since the signature is what authorises it. The agent exchanges the token at `keyless/certify` for ten-minute certificates carrying the grant (claims `agent` and `grant`, scope at most the grant's, never past its end), so what its fresh keys sign counts in the owner's name; oxy does this itself with `author.signer = keyless` and the token from `oxy auth grant`. The token is also the agent's credential for the protocol (fetch and push): it acts as an agent's token of the owner's account, writing when the grant gives `refs` and reading otherwise, so the agent's home holds no other secret, and oxy offers it when the home has no hub token. `GET /api/v1/agents/grants` lists the caller's grants without tokens; `DELETE /api/v1/agents/grants/{id}` revokes one at once (`oh agent list`, `oh agent revoke ID`). Migration 0075 (`agent_grants`); audited as `agent.granted` and `agent.revoked`. |
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**Agent grants** (step 5, built 2026-10-17). An agent holds no key: its owner signs an Oxygen grant (§14.7) letting `agent:NAME@ACCOUNT` act for them, with the key their oxy home names (`oh agent grant NAME [--scope changes,seal,refs] [--for 30d]`), and `POST /api/v1/agents/grants {"grant": base64 signed grant}` keeps it and answers with the agent's token (`oxyagent_…`, shown once, kept as its BLAKE3 hash). The hub accepts a grant only for the caller's own `agent:NAME@USERNAME`, naming this hub's key as issuer, signed by a key linked to the caller's account and not yet ended; any personal token of the account may send it, since the signature is what authorises it. The agent exchanges the token at `keyless/certify` for ten-minute certificates carrying the grant (claims `agent` and `grant`, scope at most the grant's, never past its end), so what its fresh keys sign counts in the owner's name; oxy does this itself with `author.signer = keyless` and the token from `oxy auth grant`. The token is also the agent's credential for the protocol (fetch and push) and the API: it acts as an agent's token of the owner's account (`repo:read` and `user:read`, and `repo:write` when the grant gives `refs`), so the agent's home holds no other secret, and oxy and oh offer it when the home has no hub token. It cannot list, make or revoke grants (#253). `GET /api/v1/agents/grants` lists the caller's grants without tokens; `DELETE /api/v1/agents/grants/{id}` revokes one at once (`oh agent list`, `oh agent revoke ID`). Migration 0075 (`agent_grants`); audited as `agent.granted` and `agent.revoked`. |