# Oxygen wire protocol for implementers

This document describes what a second implementation needs to talk to an

Oxygen server or client: the transport, the message encodings, the order

of requests, and the checks each side performs. It is derived from

[spec.md](spec.md) §5.5, §14, §16 and §17; where the two disagree the

specification wins, and this document says which section to read.

Everything on the wire is deterministic CBOR (§5.1): maps have unsigned

integer keys in increasing order, integers use the shortest form, no

floats, no indefinite lengths, no tags. Objects travel as their canonical

bytes, so the receiver hashes exactly what the sender signed.

## 1. Identifiers and hashing

- **ObjectRef** (32 bytes) = BLAKE3 of `"oxy1 <type> <len>\0" || body`, where

  `<type>` is one of `chunk blob change checkpoint op attest identity policy

  state` and `<len>` is the decimal body length. A ChangeHash is the

  ObjectRef of a change; a KeyId is the ObjectRef of an identity.

- **ChangeId** (16 random bytes) survives rewrites of a change.

- **Repository id** (16 random bytes) is chosen at `init` and returned by

  `capabilities`; a client refuses to push to a repository whose id differs

  from its own.

Object encodings are in spec §5.5 (conventions), §6.1 (change), §11

(checkpoint), §12.1 (op), §14.2 (identity), §14.4 (attestation), §14.5

(policy) and §10.1 (state).

## 2. Transport

The reference server (`oxy serve`) exposes one repository per subdirectory

of its root at `<base>/<repo>/oxy/v1/<endpoint>`:

| Method and path | Body | Response |

|---|---|---|

| `GET  …/capabilities` | — | capabilities |

| `GET  …/refs` | — | refs response |

| `POST …/negotiate` | negotiate request | `{0: [hashes]}` |

| `POST …/fetch` | fetch request | Bundle |

| `POST …/objects` | objects request | Bundle |

| `POST …/checkpoint` | checkpoint request | Bundle |

| `POST …/shallow` | shallow request | `{0: [hashes]}` |

| `POST …/push` | push request | push response |

Rules:

- Request and response bodies are CBOR with `Content-Type:

  application/oxy-cbor`. A body is a single CBOR item (not a sequence).

- Repository names are `[A-Za-z0-9._-]+` and may not start with `.`; anything

  else, and any directory without `.oxy/`, is `404`.

- Reads are unauthenticated. `push` requires `Authorization: Bearer <token>`

  when the server was started with tokens; a missing or wrong token is `401`.

- Errors are plain-text bodies with a 4xx or 5xx status; the client shows the

  text. A push that is *refused* (policy, compare-and-swap) is a `200` with

  `ok = false` in the push response, not an HTTP error.

- TLS is ordinary HTTPS. The reference client trusts the system web roots

  plus an optional PEM file (`remote.<name>.ca` or `OXY_CA`); servers with

  self-signed certificates are expected to hand that file out.

- Pushes to one repository are serialised by the server; reads are not.

Embedding: `oxy_server::Server` answers any endpoint for a repository name

a host's `Backend` resolves and authorises (`open`, `authorize`, and an

`after_push` hook), so a hub with `owner/name` paths and its own accounts

routes `/{owner}/{name}/oxy/v1/{endpoint}` to `Server::handle`; `oxy serve`

is `DirBackend` on that same server.

The spec (§16) also defines framing for Noise and ZCT transports (`u32

big-endian length || bytes`); the reference implementation speaks HTTP only.

## 3. Messages

Keys are CBOR unsigned integers. `[x]` is an array of x; `bytes(32)` an

ObjectRef; "signed X" is `[X bytes, [Signature]]`.

| Message | Encoding |

|---|---|

| Signature | `{0: key id bytes(32), 1: alg (1 = Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65), 2: Ed25519 bytes(64), 3: ML-DSA-65 bytes(3309)}` |

| Signed attestation | `[attest bytes, [Signature]]` |

| Signed policy | `[policy bytes, [Signature]]` (also the policy proposal file format) |

| Capabilities | `{0: [protocol versions], 1: repo id bytes(16), 2: [feature names]}`; version `1`; features currently `["seal"]` |

| Refs response | `{0: [ref], 1: repo id, 2: signed policy or null, 3: [tag], 4: [signed policy]}` |

| ref | `{0: name, 1: state ref, 2: [heads], 3: signed attestation or null, 4: last serial or null}`; the attestation is present only when it describes the current state; `last serial` is the highest attestation serial ever recorded for the name |

| tag | `{0: name, 1: state ref, 2: [heads], 3: signed attestation or null}` |

| Negotiate request | `{0: [have], 1: [want]}`; response `{0: [hashes]}` in dependency order (no change before its dependencies) |

| Fetch request | `{0: [hashes], 1: max blob size or null}`; response a Bundle whose blobs above the size (and their chunks) are omitted |

| Objects request | `{0: [refs]}`; response a Bundle carrying only objects; a blob is accompanied by its chunks |

| Checkpoint request | `{0: [heads]}`; response a Bundle of objects: the checkpoint of exactly those heads, its payload blob, and the blob's chunks; the server computes one when it has none for those heads |

| Shallow request | `{0: [heads], 1: depth}`; response `{0: [hashes]}`: the changes within `depth` dependency steps of the heads, dependencies first |

| Bundle | `{0: [[change bytes, [Signature]]], 1: [signed attestation], 2: [[type name, object bytes]], 3: [signed policy]}` |

| Push request | `{0: Bundle, 1: [update], 2: signed policy or null, 3: [tag]}` |

| update | `{0: name, 1: old state ref, 2: new state ref, 3: force (bool), 4: signed attestation or null}` |

| Push response | `{0: [{0: name, 1: ok (bool), 2: reason (text)}]}`; a result named `policy` reports the policy update, `tags/<name>` each tag |

Bundle details:

- Changes are in dependency order, each with its individual signatures

  (possibly none).

- Key 1 carries seals (`kind = seal`) covering the changes.

- Key 2 objects are only `chunk`, `blob`, `identity`, `state`, `checkpoint`;

  a receiver rejects any other type.

- Key 3 (optional) carries the policies between the receiver's serial and

  the one in the push request, ascending, so the receiver can verify each

  step (§14.5). The refs response carries the same history in its key 4.

Sizes: a seal lists at most 4096 hashes, sorted and unique. Chunks are

32–256 KiB (FastCDC, average 64 KiB, gear table from the BLAKE3 XOF of

`"oxy1 fastcdc gear"`, spec §13.2); a receiver re-hashes every object.

## 4. Sequences

### 4.1 Clone or fetch

1. `capabilities`: check protocol version 1 and record the repository id.

2. `refs`: for each wanted bookmark note `state`, `heads`, `attestation`;

   take the policy and history.

3. Policy (spec §14.5): with no local policy, accept the remote's if it is

   for this repository and carries a valid signature by one of its own roots

   (trust on first use). With a local policy, refuse a lower serial or a

   different policy at the same serial; otherwise verify each policy in the

   chain against the one before it (signatures by the previous roots meeting

   the previous threshold, serial strictly increasing) and adopt them in

   order. Record the highest serial this remote has ever presented and

   refuse a remote that later presents none or a lower one.

4. `negotiate` with `have` = local heads of every bookmark, `want` = the

   remote heads. The response lists the missing changes.

5. `fetch` those hashes (with `max blob size` for a partial clone). Store

   objects, changes and seals; verify every change's signatures and seals;

   under a policy, authenticate each new change (§14.4: signer is the author

   or a delegate of the author) and check it is authorised for the bookmark

   by the first matching rule (a rule key covers its rotation predecessors,

   and a delegate's signature counts for the author).

6. Verify the bookmark's attestation (`kind = ref`: repo id, name, old

   state, new state, serial) against the policy and against the serial you

   last recorded for that reference (rollback protection), then update

   `remotes/<name>/<bookmark>`.

7. Tags: adopt those not yet held, checking their attestations the same way.

A shallow clone replaces steps 4–5 by `shallow` (the hashes within the

depth) plus `checkpoint` for the heads, and fetches only the listed changes;

their missing dependencies form the boundary. Lazy blobs are fetched later

with `objects`.

### 4.2 Push

1. `capabilities` and `refs` as above; refuse if the remote's policy is

   newer than yours (fetch first).

2. Compute the changes the remote lacks (`negotiate` with the roles

   reversed, or locally from the remote heads), bundle them in dependency

   order with their signatures, seal your unsigned changes with one `seal`

   attestation, and attach identities, blobs, chunks and the new state

   object.

3. Attest the reference: `kind = ref` with `serial` = the remote's `last

   serial + 1`, signed by your key.

4. Send `push` with `old state` = the state the remote reported (empty

   state ref when the bookmark is new), the new state, and your policy with

   its intermediate history when the remote's serial is behind.

### 4.3 What a server checks on push

In this order, spec §16.4: adopt the policy chain if present (each step

verified against the previous policy); import the bundle, verifying every

object's hash and, under a policy, every change's authentication and

authorisation; verify the reference attestation (signer authorised for the

name, serial above the last recorded); check `old state` equals the current

state (compare-and-swap; `force` skips this check only); check the rule's

`allow_conflicts` and `require` (signed, sealed, any); check every

dependency of every change is present; then update the references

atomically and record the attestation. Any failure rejects the whole push

with `ok = false` and a reason.

## 4.4 Editors and tools on the same machine

A tool that drives a local repository does not speak this protocol; it runs

`oxy` with `--json` (spec §24) and reads one JSON document per command. The

VS Code extension in `oxygen-vscode/docs/spec.md` §4 lists the commands it

relies on.

## 5. Minimal implementations

A **read-only client** needs: CBOR decode, BLAKE3, the change and state

decoders, `capabilities`/`refs`/`negotiate`/`fetch`, and the ability to

materialise a state (spec §7–§9). Signature verification (Ed25519 and

ML-DSA-65) is required to honour a policy; without it, treat every

repository as unverified and say so.

A **server** needs the above plus storage, the push checks of §4.3, per-

repository write serialisation, and the policy chain (`refs` key 4, bundle

key 3). It never needs a private key of its own: servers store and forward

signatures, they do not make them.

Test material: the encoders and decoders in `crates/oxy-core/src/protocol.rs`

(`wire` module) and the round-trip and corruption tests beside them; the

signature vectors in `crates/oxy-core/src/identity.rs`; and the chunking

bounds test in `crates/oxy-core/src/chunk.rs`.