crates/oxy-core/src/repo/identity.rs at v0.8.0 · andymccall/oxygen

◆ v0.8.0 oxygen / crates / oxy-core / src / repo / identity.rs
30.3 KiB · Rust · last changed A keyless agent's grant survives its owner's key rotation (closes #135) 11 days ago source blame history raw
//! Identities, signing, and signature verification (spec §14).

use super::*;

/// Outcome of verifying the signatures on a change (spec §14.3, §14.4).
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum SignatureStatus {
    Unsigned,
    /// `revoked` marks a signature that verifies but whose key has since
    /// been revoked by policy or by a revocation this repository recorded.
    Valid {
        key: KeyId,
        name: String,
        email: String,
        sealed: bool,
        revoked: bool,
    },
    Invalid(String),
}

/// The outcome of replacing the configured identity (spec §14.2).
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct Rotation {
    pub old: KeyId,
    pub new: KeyId,
    pub identity: Identity,
    /// The policy update that moved the old key's grants to the new key,
    /// when the repository has a policy naming the old key.
    pub policy: Option<PolicyUpdate>,
}

impl Repo {
    // ------------------------------------------------------------ identity

    /// Generate a composite key pair, store its identity object, keep the
    /// secret in the key directory, and record the author at `scope`.
    pub fn create_identity(
        &mut self,
        name: &str,
        email: &str,
        scope: IdentityScope,
    ) -> Result<(KeyId, Identity)> {
        self.create_identity_with(name, email, scope, None)
    }

    /// `create_identity` with an expiry (milliseconds since the epoch).
    pub fn create_identity_with(
        &mut self,
        name: &str,
        email: &str,
        scope: IdentityScope,
        expires: Option<u64>,
    ) -> Result<(KeyId, Identity)> {
        let sk = SecretKey::generate();
        let mut id = sk.identity(name, email, Hlc::now().wall_ms);
        id.expires = expires;
        let key = self.install_key(&id, &sk)?;
        self.set_author(&id, &key, scope)?;
        Ok((key, id))
    }

    /// Store an identity and keep its secret (and a copy of the identity)
    /// in the key directory.
    fn install_key(&self, id: &Identity, sk: &SecretKey) -> Result<KeyId> {
        let key = self.store.put_identity(id)?;
        fs::create_dir_all(&self.keys_dir)?;
        let path = self.keys_dir.join(format!("{}.secret", key.to_hex()));
        crate::durable::write_atomic_private(&path, &sk.encode(&key))?;
        write_atomic(
            &self.keys_dir.join(format!("{}.identity", key.to_hex())),
            &id.encode(),
        )?;
        Ok(key)
    }

    fn set_author(&mut self, id: &Identity, key: &KeyId, scope: IdentityScope) -> Result<()> {
        match scope {
            IdentityScope::Repo => {
                self.config.set("author.name", &id.name)?;
                self.config.set("author.email", &id.email)?;
                self.config.set("author.key", &key.to_hex())?;
                self.save_config()?;
            }
            IdentityScope::User => {
                Config::set_user(&self.user_config, "author.name", &id.name)?;
                Config::set_user(&self.user_config, "author.email", &id.email)?;
                Config::set_user(&self.user_config, "author.key", &key.to_hex())?;
                self.config = Config::load(Some(&self.user_config), &self.oxy.join("config"))?;
            }
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    /// The scope that holds the configured author key.
    fn author_scope(&self) -> IdentityScope {
        if self.config.repo_layer().contains_key("author.key") {
            IdentityScope::Repo
        } else {
            IdentityScope::User
        }
    }

    /// Record a successor key everywhere the old one was named: the
    /// repository layer when it pins the old key, and the user file when
    /// it names the old key, so every checkout that followed the old key
    /// follows the new one (oxygen#69). A key named nowhere falls back to
    /// the scope that resolved it.
    fn record_successor(&mut self, id: &Identity, old: &KeyId, new_key: &KeyId) -> Result<()> {
        let names = |v: Option<&String>| v.and_then(|k| KeyId::from_hex(k)) == Some(*old);
        let repo_pins = names(self.config.repo_layer().get("author.key"));
        let user_entries = super::config::read_config_file(&self.user_config).unwrap_or_default();
        let user_names = names(user_entries.get("author.key"));
        if !repo_pins && !user_names {
            return self.set_author(id, new_key, self.author_scope());
        }
        if user_names {
            self.set_author(id, new_key, IdentityScope::User)?;
        }
        if repo_pins {
            self.set_author(id, new_key, IdentityScope::Repo)?;
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Replace the configured identity by `new` signed with `sk`: store it,
    /// record a `rotate` attestation signed by the old key, move the old
    /// key's policy grants to the new key, and switch the author config.
    fn replace_identity(
        &mut self,
        new: Identity,
        sk: SecretKey,
        command: &str,
    ) -> Result<Rotation> {
        let Some((old, old_sk)) = self.secret_key()? else {
            return fail("no secret key: run `oxy identity create` first");
        };
        if new.previous != Some(old) {
            return fail("the successor identity must name the current key as previous");
        }
        let new_key = self.install_key(&new, &sk)?;
        let attest = Attest {
            repo: self.id()?,
            hlc: Hlc::now(),
            body: AttestBody::Rotate { new: new_key },
        };
        let r = self.store.put_attest(&attest)?;
        self.store
            .put_signature(&r, &old_sk.sign(Domain::Attest, &old, &r))?;
        let policy = match self.current_policy()? {
            Some((_, sp)) if sp.policy.mentions(&old) => {
                let mut p = self.next_policy()?;
                p.substitute_key(&old, new.clone());
                Some(self.sign_policy_with(p, &[(old, &old_sk), (new_key, &sk)], command)?)
            }
            _ => None,
        };
        self.record_successor(&new, &old, &new_key)?;
        Ok(Rotation {
            old,
            new: new_key,
            identity: new,
            policy,
        })
    }

    /// Rotate to a fresh key pair; the new identity names the old one as
    /// `previous` and keeps its name, email, delegates, and expiry.
    pub fn rotate_identity(&mut self) -> Result<Rotation> {
        let Some((old, _)) = self.secret_key()? else {
            return fail("no secret key: run `oxy identity create` first");
        };
        let cur = self.identity(&old)?;
        let sk = SecretKey::generate();
        let mut id = sk.identity(&cur.name, &cur.email, Hlc::now().wall_ms);
        id.previous = Some(old);
        id.delegates = cur.delegates.clone();
        id.expires = cur.expires;
        self.replace_identity(id, sk, "oxy identity rotate")
    }

    /// Re-issue the identity with the same keys and a new expiry.
    pub fn renew_identity(&mut self, expires: Option<u64>) -> Result<Rotation> {
        let Some((old, sk)) = self.secret_key()? else {
            return fail("no secret key: run `oxy identity create` first");
        };
        let cur = self.identity(&old)?;
        let id = cur.successor(cur.delegates.clone(), expires, Hlc::now().wall_ms);
        self.replace_identity(id, sk, "oxy identity renew")
    }

    /// Let `delegate` act on this identity's behalf within `scope` until
    /// `expires` (spec §14.2). Delegates are part of the identity object,
    /// so this re-issues it with the same keys.
    pub fn delegate_add(
        &mut self,
        delegate: Identity,
        scope: Scope,
        expires: Option<u64>,
    ) -> Result<Rotation> {
        self.delegate_add_many(vec![delegate], scope, expires)
    }

    /// As [`Repo::delegate_add`], for several delegates in one rotation.
    pub fn delegate_add_many(
        &mut self,
        new_delegates: Vec<Identity>,
        scope: Scope,
        expires: Option<u64>,
    ) -> Result<Rotation> {
        let Some((old, sk)) = self.secret_key()? else {
            return fail("no secret key: run `oxy identity create` first");
        };
        if scope.is_empty() {
            return fail("a delegate needs at least one scope: changes, refs or seal");
        }
        if new_delegates.is_empty() {
            return fail("name at least one identity file");
        }
        let cur = self.identity(&old)?;
        let mut delegates = cur.delegates.clone();
        let mut added = Vec::new();
        for delegate in new_delegates {
            let dk = self.store.put_identity(&delegate)?;
            added.push(dk);
            if dk == old {
                return fail("an identity cannot delegate to itself");
            }
            if cur.delegate(&dk).is_some()
                || delegates
                    .iter()
                    .skip(cur.delegates.len())
                    .any(|d| d.key == dk)
            {
                return fail(format!(
                    "{} is already a delegate; remove it first to change its scope or expiry",
                    dk.short(12)
                ));
            }
            delegates.push(Delegate {
                key: dk,
                scope,
                expires,
            });
        }
        let id = cur.successor(delegates, cur.expires, Hlc::now().wall_ms);
        self.replace_identity(
            id,
            sk,
            &format!(
                "oxy identity delegate add {} --scope {scope}",
                added
                    .iter()
                    .map(|k| k.short(12))
                    .collect::<Vec<_>>()
                    .join(" ")
            ),
        )
    }

    /// Withdraw a delegation; re-issues the identity with the same keys.
    pub fn delegate_remove(&mut self, delegate: &KeyId) -> Result<Rotation> {
        let Some((old, sk)) = self.secret_key()? else {
            return fail("no secret key: run `oxy identity create` first");
        };
        let cur = self.identity(&old)?;
        if cur.delegate(delegate).is_none() {
            return fail(format!("{} is not a delegate", delegate.short(12)));
        }
        let delegates = cur
            .delegates
            .iter()
            .copied()
            .filter(|d| d.key != *delegate)
            .collect();
        let id = cur.successor(delegates, cur.expires, Hlc::now().wall_ms);
        self.replace_identity(
            id,
            sk,
            &format!("oxy identity delegate remove {}", delegate.short(12)),
        )
    }

    /// Revoke `key` (your own, one you delegated to, or any key when you
    /// hold a policy root): record a signed `revoke` attestation and a
    /// local marker, and drop the key from the policy where it has one.
    /// Revoking a delegate does not re-issue the identity; `delegate_remove`
    /// does that, and the CLI does both.
    pub fn revoke_identity(&self, key: &KeyId, reason: &str) -> Result<Option<PolicyUpdate>> {
        let Some((own, sk)) = self.secret_key()? else {
            return fail("no secret key: run `oxy identity create` first");
        };
        let policy = self.current_policy()?.map(|(_, sp)| sp.policy);
        let is_root = policy.as_ref().is_some_and(|p| p.roots.contains(&own));
        let is_delegate = self.identity(&own)?.delegate(key).is_some();
        if *key != own && !is_root && !is_delegate {
            return fail("only the key's holder, the identity that delegated to it, or a policy root can revoke it");
        }
        let attest = Attest {
            repo: self.id()?,
            hlc: Hlc::now(),
            body: AttestBody::Revoke {
                key: *key,
                reason: reason.into(),
            },
        };
        let r = self.store.put_attest(&attest)?;
        self.store
            .put_signature(&r, &sk.sign(Domain::Attest, &own, &r))?;
        let dir = self.oxy.join("revoked");
        fs::create_dir_all(&dir)?;
        write_atomic(&dir.join(key.to_hex()), r.to_hex().as_bytes())?;
        match policy {
            Some(p) if p.mentions(key) => Ok(Some(self.policy_revoke(key)?)),
            _ => Ok(None),
        }
    }

    /// Whether `key` is revoked by the policy or by a recorded revocation.
    pub fn is_revoked(&self, key: &KeyId) -> Result<bool> {
        if self.oxy.join("revoked").join(key.to_hex()).exists() {
            return Ok(true);
        }
        Ok(self
            .current_policy()?
            .is_some_and(|(_, sp)| sp.policy.is_revoked(key)))
    }

    /// The key this repository signs with: `author.signer` when set (an
    /// agent's own key, acting for the author), else `author.key`.
    pub fn signing_key(&self) -> Option<KeyId> {
        if self.config.signer_keyless {
            // The key certified last, once this command has signed.
            return self.keyless_key.borrow().as_ref().map(|(k, _, _)| *k);
        }
        self.config.signer_key.or(self.config.author_key)
    }

    /// The secret key for `author.signer`, else `author.key`, if configured
    /// and present on disk. The identity object is kept beside the secret
    /// so a repository that has never seen it (a fresh clone) can store it
    /// when it first signs.
    pub fn secret_key(&self) -> Result<Option<(KeyId, SecretKey)>> {
        if self.config.signer_keyless {
            return self.keyless_secret().map(Some);
        }
        let Some(key) = self.signing_key() else {
            return Ok(None);
        };
        let path = self.keys_dir.join(format!("{}.secret", key.to_hex()));
        match fs::read(&path) {
            Ok(b) => {
                let (k, sk) = SecretKey::decode(&b)?;
                if k != key {
                    return fail(format!(
                        "{} holds a different key than its name",
                        path.display()
                    ));
                }
                if !self.store.has(&key) {
                    let id_path = self.keys_dir.join(format!("{}.identity", key.to_hex()));
                    if let Ok(bytes) = fs::read(&id_path) {
                        let id = Identity::decode(&bytes)?;
                        if id.hash() == key {
                            self.store.put_identity(&id)?;
                        }
                    }
                }
                Ok(Some((k, sk)))
            }
            Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => Ok(None),
            Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
        }
    }

    /// An identity: from this repository's store, or else from the key
    /// directory, where `oxy identity create` keeps the user's own (a new
    /// repository has not stored it yet). The file must hash to `key`.
    pub fn identity(&self, key: &KeyId) -> Result<Identity> {
        match self.store.get_identity(key) {
            Ok(id) => Ok(id),
            Err(e) => {
                let path = self.keys_dir.join(format!("{}.identity", key.to_hex()));
                match fs::read(&path) {
                    Ok(bytes) => {
                        let id = Identity::decode(&bytes)?;
                        if id.hash() != *key {
                            return fail(format!(
                                "{} does not hold identity {}",
                                path.display(),
                                key.short(12)
                            ));
                        }
                        Ok(id)
                    }
                    // The configured author's identity is neither in the
                    // repository nor in this home's keys: say why and what
                    // to do (oxygen#82), rather than "object … not found".
                    Err(_) if self.config.author_key == Some(*key) => fail(format!(
                        "this repository has no identity {} (author.key, set in {}): it is not in the repository, nor in {}.\n\
                         An agent home names its human's identity, and each delegation rotates that identity, so the key goes stale. \
                         Pin the identity this repository uses, as its owner sees it: `oxy identity show` in the owner's shell gives the key, \
                         then `oxy config author.key <KEY>` here; or ask the owner.",
                        key.short(12),
                        if self.config.is_repo_set("author.key") {
                            "this repository's config"
                        } else {
                            "the user config"
                        },
                        self.keys_dir.display()
                    )),
                    Err(_) => Err(e.into()),
                }
            }
        }
    }

    /// Sign a stored change with the configured secret key.
    pub fn sign_change(&self, hash: &ChangeHash) -> Result<Signature> {
        let Some((key, sk)) = self.secret_key()? else {
            return fail("no secret key: run `oxy identity create` first");
        };
        let sig = sk.sign(Domain::Change, &key, hash);
        self.store.put_signature(hash, &sig)?;
        Ok(sig)
    }

    /// Check the signatures on a change against the author-or-delegate rule.
    pub fn verify_change(&self, hash: &ChangeHash) -> Result<SignatureStatus> {
        self.verify_change_known(hash, None)
    }

    /// `verify_change`, with the change's metadata when the caller has it
    /// (a change object can be as large as the tree it adds). Signatures
    /// are looked up first: an unsigned change needs no metadata.
    fn verify_change_known(
        &self,
        hash: &ChangeHash,
        known: Option<&crate::state::ChangeMeta>,
    ) -> Result<SignatureStatus> {
        let sigs = self.store.signatures(hash)?;
        if sigs.is_empty() {
            return Ok(SignatureStatus::Unsigned);
        }
        let read;
        let change = match known {
            Some(m) => m,
            None => {
                read = self.store.get_change_meta(hash)?;
                &read
            }
        };
        let mut last_err = String::new();
        for sig in &sigs {
            match self.check_signer(change, sig, Domain::Change, hash) {
                Ok(id) => {
                    return Ok(SignatureStatus::Valid {
                        key: sig.key,
                        name: self.certified_subject(&sig.key).unwrap_or(id.name),
                        email: id.email,
                        sealed: false,
                        revoked: self.is_revoked(&sig.key)?,
                    })
                }
                Err(e) => last_err = e,
            }
        }
        Ok(SignatureStatus::Invalid(last_err))
    }

    /// Whether `signer` is a short-lived key acting for `author` under a
    /// grant (spec §14.7): its certificate verifies with its issuer and
    /// carries a grant `author` signed, for the certificate's subject and
    /// issuer, giving `needed` at `at_ms` (the change's time, as for a
    /// delegation). Whether the certificate covered the time it signed is
    /// the policy's check, at a time the signer did not choose. `None`
    /// when it does; otherwise why not.
    fn granted(
        &self,
        author: &KeyId,
        signer: &KeyId,
        needed: Scope,
        at_ms: u64,
    ) -> std::result::Result<Option<String>, String> {
        let neither = || {
            Some(format!(
                "key {} is neither the author nor a delegate",
                signer.short(12)
            ))
        };
        let Ok(Some(c)) = self.store.certificate_of(signer) else {
            return Ok(neither());
        };
        let Ok(sc) = self.store.get_certificate(&c) else {
            return Ok(neither());
        };
        let Some(g) = &sc.cert.grant else {
            return Ok(neither());
        };
        let who = signer.short(12);
        let issuer = self
            .store
            .get_identity(&sc.cert.issuer)
            .map_err(|_| format!("key {who}'s certificate names an unknown issuer"))?;
        sc.verify(&issuer)
            .map_err(|e| format!("key {who}'s certificate: {e}"))?;
        // A grant by an earlier key of the author's identity counts while
        // it was made before that key was rotated away (oxygen#135).
        if g.grant.grantor != *author && !self.granted_before_rotation(author, &g.grant) {
            return Ok(neither());
        }
        let grantor = self
            .identity(&g.grant.grantor)
            .map_err(|_| format!("key {who}'s grant is by an unknown author"))?;
        g.verify(&grantor)
            .map_err(|e| format!("key {who}'s grant: {e}"))?;
        if g.grant.subject != sc.cert.subject || g.grant.issuer != sc.cert.issuer {
            return Err(format!(
                "key {who}'s grant is for {} from issuer {}, not its certificate's",
                g.grant.subject,
                g.grant.issuer.short(12)
            ));
        }
        if !sc.cert.scope.has(needed) || !g.grant.scope.has(needed) {
            return Err(format!("key {who} is not granted {needed}"));
        }
        if !g.grant.covers(needed, at_ms) {
            return Err(format!(
                "key {who}'s grant did not cover the time the change was made"
            ));
        }
        Ok(None)
    }

    /// Whether `grant` is by a key `author`'s identity was rotated from,
    /// made before that rotation (oxygen#135). An owner rotates with every
    /// delegation, and a repository may name the newest key as the author
    /// while the agent's grant is by an older one; the grant stays good, as
    /// a policy keeps a predecessor's signatures from before the rotation
    /// (spec §14.5), but a key rotated away grants nothing new.
    fn granted_before_rotation(&self, author: &KeyId, grant: &crate::cert::Grant) -> bool {
        let mut cur = self.identity(author).ok();
        for _ in 0..32 {
            let Some(id) = cur else {
                return false;
            };
            match id.previous {
                Some(prev) if prev == grant.grantor => return grant.not_before < id.created,
                Some(prev) => cur = self.identity(&prev).ok(),
                None => return false,
            }
        }
        false
    }

    /// The subject a short-lived key was certified for (spec §14.7), such
    /// as `agent:claude@andy`: what names it, since its identity is only
    /// a fresh key's.
    pub fn certified_subject(&self, key: &KeyId) -> Option<String> {
        let c = self.store.certificate_of(key).ok()??;
        Some(self.store.get_certificate(&c).ok()?.cert.subject)
    }

    /// Verify `sig` over `target` and check the author-or-delegate rule for `change`.
    fn check_signer(
        &self,
        change: &crate::state::ChangeMeta,
        sig: &Signature,
        domain: Domain,
        target: &ObjectRef,
    ) -> std::result::Result<Identity, String> {
        let id = self
            .store
            .get_identity(&sig.key)
            .map_err(|_| format!("unknown key {}", sig.key.short(12)))?;
        // The author-or-delegate rule (spec §14.4). A change whose author is
        // the zero key names nobody (Git imports, history from before an
        // identity existed), so any key may adopt it with a seal; policy
        // then authorises that key for the reference as usual. A delegate
        // acts within its scope, signing changes or sealing them, and only
        // until its delegation expires (§14.2).
        if !change.author.is_zero() && sig.key != change.author {
            let needed = match domain {
                Domain::Change => Scope::CHANGES,
                _ => Scope::SEAL,
            };
            let delegation = self
                .store
                .get_identity(&change.author)
                .ok()
                .and_then(|a| a.delegate(&sig.key).copied());
            match delegation {
                // A certified key acting under the author's grant (§14.7).
                None => {
                    if let Some(why) =
                        self.granted(&change.author, &sig.key, needed, change.hlc.wall_ms)?
                    {
                        return Err(why);
                    }
                }
                Some(d) if !d.scope.has(needed) => {
                    return Err(format!(
                        "key {} is a delegate for {} only and may not {}",
                        sig.key.short(12),
                        d.scope,
                        if needed == Scope::SEAL {
                            "seal"
                        } else {
                            "sign changes"
                        }
                    ))
                }
                Some(d) if !d.allows(needed, change.hlc.wall_ms) => {
                    return Err(format!(
                        "key {}'s delegation had expired when the change was made",
                        sig.key.short(12)
                    ))
                }
                Some(_) => {}
            }
        }
        if id.is_expired_at(change.hlc.wall_ms) {
            return Err(format!(
                "key {} had expired when the change was made",
                sig.key.short(12)
            ));
        }
        verify_signature(&id, sig, domain, target).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
        Ok(id)
    }

    /// Like `verify_change`, but a change with no valid individual signature
    /// is also authenticated by a valid seal covering it (spec §14.4).
    pub fn authenticate_change(&self, hash: &ChangeHash) -> Result<SignatureStatus> {
        self.authenticate_change_known(hash, None)
    }

    /// `authenticate_change`, with the change's metadata when the caller
    /// has it (from a log, say), so the change itself need not be read.
    pub fn authenticate_change_known(
        &self,
        hash: &ChangeHash,
        known: Option<&crate::state::ChangeMeta>,
    ) -> Result<SignatureStatus> {
        let direct = self.verify_change_known(hash, known)?;
        if matches!(direct, SignatureStatus::Valid { .. }) {
            return Ok(direct);
        }
        let mut last_err = match &direct {
            SignatureStatus::Invalid(e) => e.clone(),
            _ => String::new(),
        };
        let seals = self.store.seals_for(hash)?;
        if seals.is_empty() {
            return Ok(match last_err.is_empty() {
                true => SignatureStatus::Unsigned,
                false => SignatureStatus::Invalid(last_err),
            });
        }
        let read;
        let change = match known {
            Some(m) => m,
            None => {
                read = self.store.get_change_meta(hash)?;
                &read
            }
        };
        for seal_ref in seals {
            let attest = self.store.get_attest(&seal_ref)?;
            let AttestBody::Seal { hashes } = &attest.body else {
                continue;
            };
            if !hashes.contains(hash) {
                continue;
            }
            for sig in self.store.signatures(&seal_ref)? {
                match self.check_signer(change, &sig, Domain::Attest, &seal_ref) {
                    Ok(id) => {
                        return Ok(SignatureStatus::Valid {
                            key: sig.key,
                            name: self.certified_subject(&sig.key).unwrap_or(id.name),
                            email: id.email,
                            sealed: true,
                            revoked: self.is_revoked(&sig.key)?,
                        })
                    }
                    Err(e) => last_err = e,
                }
            }
        }
        if last_err.is_empty() {
            Ok(SignatureStatus::Unsigned)
        } else {
            Ok(SignatureStatus::Invalid(last_err))
        }
    }

    /// Store and sign an attestation with the configured key.
    /// Seal changes with the identity key (spec §14.4): a stored, indexed
    /// seal attestation over `hashes`, pushed with the next push. Returns
    /// the attestation's reference.
    pub fn seal(&self, hashes: &[ChangeHash]) -> Result<ObjectRef> {
        if hashes.is_empty() {
            return fail("nothing to seal");
        }
        if hashes.len() > crate::attest::MAX_SEAL_HASHES {
            return fail(format!(
                "a seal covers at most {} changes",
                crate::attest::MAX_SEAL_HASHES
            ));
        }
        for h in hashes {
            if !self.store.has(h) {
                return fail(format!("unknown change {}", h.short(12)));
            }
        }
        let mut sorted = hashes.to_vec();
        sorted.sort();
        sorted.dedup();
        let sa = self.sign_attest(&Attest::seal(self.id()?, sorted.clone()))?;
        let r = self.store.put_attest(&sa.attest)?;
        for sig in &sa.sigs {
            self.store.put_signature(&r, sig)?;
        }
        for h in &sorted {
            self.store.index_seal(h, &r)?;
        }
        Ok(r)
    }

    /// Whether `signer` seals changes by `author`: its own, anonymous ones
    /// (§14.4), and, when it signs for the configured author (a delegate,
    /// or a short-lived key under the author's grant, §14.7), the
    /// author's. A receiver still checks it may.
    pub(crate) fn seals_for_author(&self, author: &KeyId, signer: &KeyId) -> bool {
        author == signer
            || author.is_zero()
            || ((self.config.signer_key.is_some() || self.config.signer_keyless)
                && self.config.author_key == Some(*author))
    }

    /// The changes of the current bookmark this identity can authenticate
    /// but has not: its own unsigned ones, anonymous ones, and the
    /// author's when it signs for them.
    pub fn sealable(&self) -> Result<Vec<ChangeHash>> {
        let Some((key, _)) = self.secret_key()? else {
            return fail("no identity: run oxy identity create");
        };
        let heads = self.bookmark_heads()?;
        let state = self.load_state_history(&heads)?;
        let mut out = Vec::new();
        for (h, meta) in state.changes() {
            if self.seals_for_author(&meta.author, &key)
                && !matches!(self.authenticate_change(h)?, SignatureStatus::Valid { .. })
            {
                out.push(*h);
            }
        }
        out.sort();
        Ok(out)
    }

    pub(crate) fn sign_attest(&self, attest: &Attest) -> Result<SignedAttest> {
        let Some((key, sk)) = self.secret_key()? else {
            return fail("no secret key: run `oxy identity create` first");
        };
        let r = self.store.put_attest(attest)?;
        let sig = sk.sign(Domain::Attest, &key, &r);
        self.store.put_signature(&r, &sig)?;
        if let AttestBody::Seal { hashes } = &attest.body {
            for h in hashes {
                self.store.index_seal(h, &r)?;
            }
        }
        Ok(SignedAttest {
            attest: attest.clone(),
            sigs: vec![sig],
        })
    }
}
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