//! Authentication and authorisation (hub spec §5, §15.3): passwords,

//! session cookies, CSRF tokens, TOTP, personal access tokens, roles, and

//! the viewer extractor pages use.

pub mod phone;

pub mod roles;

pub mod totp;

pub mod viewer;

pub use roles::{Access, Role};

pub use viewer::{Viewer, ViewerAccount};

use argon2::password_hash::{PasswordHash, PasswordHasher, PasswordVerifier, SaltString};

use argon2::Argon2;

use rand::RngCore;

use std::path::Path;

use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;

/// The key that signs cookies and CSRF tokens, kept in `<data>/keys/cookie.key`.

#[derive(Clone)]

pub struct CookieKey([u8; 32]);

impl CookieKey {

    pub fn load_or_create(keys: &Path) -> anyhow::Result<CookieKey> {

        std::fs::create_dir_all(keys)?;

        let path = keys.join("cookie.key");

        if let Ok(bytes) = std::fs::read(&path) {

            if bytes.len() == 32 {

                return Ok(CookieKey(bytes.try_into().unwrap()));

            }

        }

        let mut k = [0u8; 32];

        rand::rngs::OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut k);

        std::fs::write(&path, k)?;

        #[cfg(unix)]

        {

            use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;

            std::fs::set_permissions(&path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600))?;

        }

        Ok(CookieKey(k))

    }

    /// Keyed BLAKE3 over `message`, as hex.

    pub fn mac(&self, message: &[u8]) -> String {

        hex::encode(blake3::keyed_hash(&self.0, message).as_bytes())

    }

}

/// Constant-time equality of two hex MACs.

pub fn mac_equal(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {

    a.len() == b.len() && a.as_bytes().ct_eq(b.as_bytes()).into()

}

pub fn hash_password(password: &str) -> anyhow::Result<String> {

    let salt = SaltString::generate(&mut rand::rngs::OsRng);

    Ok(Argon2::default().hash_password(password.as_bytes(), &salt).map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("{e}"))?.to_string())

}

pub fn verify_password(hash: &str, password: &str) -> bool {

    match PasswordHash::new(hash) {

        Ok(parsed) => Argon2::default().verify_password(password.as_bytes(), &parsed).is_ok(),

        Err(_) => false,

    }

}

/// A password policy that is honest rather than theatrical: length only.

pub fn password_ok(password: &str) -> Result<(), &'static str> {

    if password.chars().count() < 10 {

        return Err("a password is at least 10 characters");

    }

    if password.len() > 256 {

        return Err("a password is at most 256 bytes");

    }

    Ok(())

}

pub fn random_hex(bytes: usize) -> String {

    let mut b = vec![0u8; bytes];

    rand::rngs::OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut b);

    hex::encode(b)

}

/// A personal access token: `oxyhub_` plus 32 random bytes as hex. Stored

/// as its BLAKE3 hash.

pub fn new_token() -> (String, String) {

    let secret = format!("oxyhub_{}", random_hex(32));

    (secret.clone(), token_hash(&secret))

}

pub fn token_hash(secret: &str) -> String {

    hex::encode(blake3::hash(secret.as_bytes()).as_bytes())

}

/// A new session id for the cookie (oxygenhub#223): random, and kept on

/// the server only as its [`token_hash`].

pub fn new_session_id() -> String {

    random_hex(32)

}

/// Proof, for the code step of a sign-in with two-factor authentication,

/// that `username` gave the right password: `UNTIL.MAC`, good until `until`

/// (ms) and void as soon as the account's session salt changes (a new

/// password, or everyone signed out), so the code step need not ask for

/// the password again.

pub fn pending_login(key: &CookieKey, username: &str, session_salt: &str, until: i64) -> String {

    format!("{until}.{}", key.mac(format!("pending-login:{username}:{session_salt}:{until}").as_bytes()))

}

/// Whether `token` is a [`pending_login`] for this account still in time.

pub fn pending_login_ok(key: &CookieKey, username: &str, session_salt: &str, token: &str, now: i64) -> bool {

    let Some((until, _)) = token.split_once('.') else { return false };

    let Ok(until) = until.parse::<i64>() else { return false };

    until > now && mac_equal(token, &pending_login(key, username, session_salt, until))

}

/// The CSRF token bound to a session value.

pub fn csrf_token(key: &CookieKey, session_value: &str) -> String {

    key.mac(format!("csrf:{session_value}").as_bytes())

}

pub const SESSION_COOKIE: &str = "oxyhub";

#[cfg(test)]

mod tests {

    use super::*;

    #[test]

    fn passwords_and_tokens() {

        let h = hash_password("correct horse battery").unwrap();

        assert!(verify_password(&h, "correct horse battery"));

        assert!(!verify_password(&h, "wrong"));

        assert!(!verify_password("garbage", "x"));

        assert!(password_ok("short").is_err());

        let (secret, hash) = new_token();

        assert!(secret.starts_with("oxyhub_"));

        assert_eq!(token_hash(&secret), hash);

        assert!(mac_equal("ab", "ab") && !mac_equal("ab", "ac") && !mac_equal("a", "ab"));

    }

    #[test]

    fn cookie_key_persists() {

        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();

        let a = CookieKey::load_or_create(dir.path()).unwrap();

        let b = CookieKey::load_or_create(dir.path()).unwrap();

        assert_eq!(a.mac(b"x"), b.mac(b"x"));

        let v = new_session_id();

        assert_eq!(v.len(), 64);

        assert_ne!(v, new_session_id());

        assert_ne!(csrf_token(&a, &v), csrf_token(&a, "other"));

    }

}